This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare. ✩ We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Karl Farmer, John Hassler, Kei-ichi Koda, Ronald Wendner and seminar participants at
Introduction
Why do western countries have different welfare programs although they share similar backgrounds? Who supports redistribution in these countries? How income inequality is related to redistributive politics? Hassler et al. [14] and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti [16] developed a model that answers these questions based on the feedback mechanism between individual decisions and redistributive politics (Glomm and Ravikumar [12] ; ; Benabou [7] ). The feedback mechanism creates a joint determination of inequality and redistribution, which results in multiple equilibria: a pro-welfare state and an anti-welfare state. In the pro-welfare (anti-welfare) state, expectations of higher (lower) redistribution lead to lower (higher) educational investment, and thus, a majority of the poor (rich); the majority of the poor (rich) then support higher (lower) redistribution. Which state is realized depends on the expectations of agents.
The model of Hassler et al. [14] and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti [16] presents the crosscountry differences in welfare programs among western countries sharing similar backgrounds. However, they abstract intragenerational mobility from their model and preclude the prediction that fits the POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis supported by the US data (Benabou and Ok [8] ; Alesina and La Ferrara [2]): the poor do not support higher redistribution because of a hope for upward mobility in the future. In order to explain the differences in welfare programs among western countries, there is a need to develop a model that includes an equilibrium that supports the POUM hypothesis as well as multiple equilibria with different patterns of redistribution, mobility, and inequality.
Independently of the above-mentioned studies, Quadrini [24] succeeded in providing a model including the POUM hypothesis, based on an endogenous growth model that produces multiple equilibria: the growing equilibrium with high mobility, high inequality and low redistribution, supporting the POUM hypothesis; and the stagnant economy with low mobility, low inequality and high redistribution, supporting the case of a pro-welfare state. A key to this result is the assumption that growth rate of the economy affects agents' preferences over redistribution policies and thus changes the ability of the agents to learn their positions in the future distribution of income.
The multiple equilibria in Quadrini [24] predict a negative correlation between redistribution and inequality, and a positive correlation between mobility and inequality. The former prediction is supported by the empirical studies (Kristov et al. [18] ; Rodrigues [25]), but the latter is not necessarily supported by the data. Fig. 1 illustrates the scatter plot of upward mobility (OECD [21] ) and the Gini index (Förster and Mira d'Ercole [10]), which seems to show a positive correlation between mobility and inequality among sample countries. 1 For example, the United States is featured by high mobility and inequality, and Finland is featured by low mobility and inequality. The difference between these two countries could be explained by the multiple equilibria in Quadrini [24] . However, the other European countries show various patterns of upward mobility and inequality. For example, for aged 25-34 workers, inequality is greater in the United States
